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We construct a dynamic, stochastic rational expectations model of labor reallocation within a trade
model that is designed so that its key parameters can be estimated for trade policy analysis. A key
feature is the presence of time-varying idiosyncratic moving costs faced by workers.  As a consequence
of these shocks: (i) Gross flows exceed net flows (an important feature of empirical labor movements);
(ii) the economy features gradual and anticipatory adjustment to aggregate shocks; (iii) wage differentials
across locations or industries can persist in the steady state; and (iv) the normative implications of
policy can be very different from a model without idiosyncratic shocks, even when the aggregate behaviour
of both models is similar. It is shown that the equilibrium solves a particular planner's problem, thus
facilitating analytical results, econometric estimation, and simulation of the model for policy analysis.
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Both the distributional eﬀects and the eﬃciency eﬀects of a trade shock de-
pend on the costs of adjustment of workers in response to the shock. For
example, the eﬀects of opening up a sector of the economy previously pro-
tected from import competition depend crucially on how easily the workers
in that sector can ﬁnd employment in other sectors. If geographic or sectoral
mobility costs are high, the eﬃciency beneﬁts are thereby reduced and the
burden borne by those workers is increased. Analysis of the eﬀect of trade on
wages thus always requires the use of some assumption on the degree of labor
mobility.3 Further, the eﬀects of immigration into a particular region of the
country depend on how ﬂuid labor is between that region and others, and
so the literature on labor-market eﬀects of immigration has always required
assumptions on the degree of mobility (see Borjas et. al. (1996), Slaughter
and Scheve (1999)).4
This paper proposes a workhorse model of equilibrium labor reallocation
within the context of a trade model that is designed to address these policy
questions head-on. It incorporates a number of features that are intended to
make the model helpful in analyzing trade policy changes in particular, and
to be consistent with the broad empirical features of the adjustment process.
In this paper, we analyze the key theoretical properties of the model. In
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007), we study a special case with two industries,
to show the simple analytics of the model. Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(forthcoming) shows how the model can be simulated, and Artu¸ c, Chaud-
huri and McLaren (2007) estimates the structural parameters and shows the
implications for the distributional eﬀects of trade liberalization in the US.
The model is an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic stochastic version of a standard
‘Ricardo-Viner’ trade model with rational expectations, in which from time
to time random shocks may hit labor demand either in a sector or in a region
3For example, speciﬁc-factors models and the Stolper-Samuelson approach have very
diﬀerent implications for the relationship between trade and wages, driven entirely by dif-
ferent assumptions about mobility costs (see Slaughter (1998) for an extended discussion).
Further, the appropriate time horizon for measuring the labor-market eﬀects of trade also
depends on assumptions about mobility costs.
4For example, the diﬀerences between the Hecksher-Ohlin approach, the “factor-
proportions analysis” approach, and the “area analysis” approach to the eﬀects of im-
migration (Borjas et. al., 1996) are entirely driven by diﬀerent assumptions about labor
mobility. See Slaughter and Scheve (1999) for an extensive discussion.
2of the country (for example, changes in trade policy or terms-of-trade shocks).
In response to these shocks, each worker at each moment may choose whether
to remain where she is or to move to another sector or geographic location.
Unlike the standard trade model, if the worker moves, she will pay a cost,
which has two components: A portion that is the same for all workers making
the same move, which is a parameter of the model and is publicly known; and
a time-varying idiosyncratic portion. The latter is an extremely important
feature of the model, because it generates all of the model’s dynamics and
allows for gross ﬂows to exceed net ﬂows. If workers’ individual situations
vary, one may ﬁnd diﬀerent workers moving in opposite directions at the
same time, and this is indeed a prominent feature of the equilibrium of the
model. This is important because empirically gross ﬂows of workers across
geographical locations and industries are substantially larger than net ﬂows.
Many authors have proposed theoretical models of the dynamics of fac-
tor reallocation in response to a trade or policy shock. The approaches can
be classiﬁed into ‘net-ﬂows’ approaches and search-theory approaches. ‘Net-
ﬂows’ approaches assume positive costs of moving factors across sectors, with
the result that factors move gradually, and in only one direction, in response
to a shock (see Neary (1985)). The seminal work in this vein is Mussa (1978,
1982), which studies the dynamics of adjustment in a trade model, with cap-
ital as a quasi-ﬁxed factor bearing convex adjustment costs. In both models,
labor is either completely immobile (that is, labor faces inﬁnite moving costs)
or costlessly mobile (faces zero moving costs), but the roles of capital and
labor could easily be reversed to consider labor adjustment dynamics. This
is done in the labor-reallocation models of Dehejia (2003) and Karp and
Paul (2003). Dixit (1993) studies a model with random trade shocks and
a ﬁxed cost to each reallocation, and Dixit and Rob (1994) consider ﬁxed
labor-adjustment costs in a model with random labor-demand shocks and
risk-averse workers. Matsuyama (1992) studies an overlapping-generations
model whose workers cannot reallocate once they have chosen a sector, so
the dynamic adjustment to a trade shock comes entirely through new labor
market entrants.
A major limitation of these models is that in practice diﬀerent workers
change industries in opposite directions at the same time, so that gross worker
ﬂows exceed net ﬂows, a fact that these models cannot accommodate. Indeed,
in the data gross ﬂows often exceed net ﬂows in the data by a factor of
ten. This phenomenon can be accommodated by the search-theory approach,
which adapts search models such as Lucas and Prescott (1974), Jovanovic
3and Moﬃtt (1990) and Pissarides (2000) to trade models. Hosios (1990)
and Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999) study two-sector trade models in
which production requires a worker paired with a ﬁrm; workers and ﬁrms are
exogenously separated from time to time; and unmatched workers and ﬁrms
must search for a new match in order to become productive again. Thus,
these models generate unemployment, gross ﬂows, and, in principle, gradual
adjustment to a trade shock, although these papers study only the steady
state. Davidson and Matusz (2001) analyze the transitional path in a search
model following a trade liberalization, and ﬁnd that the adjustment process
absorbs much of the gains from the liberalization.
This paper combines some of the advantages of both approaches. As
with the ﬁrst approach, it presents a neo-classical, market-clearing model
with costly labor adjustment. It has the advantage deriving from its neo-
classical nature that equilibrium solves a social planner’s problem, which
allows us to use the tools of duality theory to analyze the equilibrium, which
we use extensively in Section 4 and in Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007). It also
allows us to derive a kind of Euler equation, which allows us to estimate the
structural parameters of the model, as in Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2007). On the other hand, as with the second approach, our approach
assigns a central role to gross ﬂows.
The key properties of the equilibrium proven in the paper include gradual
adjustment of the economy to an external shock; anticipatory adjustment of
the economy to an anticipated shock; and persistent wage diﬀerentials (across
sectors or regions of the economy) even in the long-run steady state, for rea-
sons that appear to be novel in the literature. Because of these diﬀerentials,
the equilibrium does not maximize national income in the long run – nor is
it optimal to do so.
In addition, we discuss two thought experiments that demonstrate the
importance of idiosyncratic costs for empirical work, even at the aggregate
level. First, we show that if the variance of idiosyncratic shocks is suﬃciently
high, aggregate variables will act as if there is no labor mobility, even though
in fact there is a lot of mobility and the welfare eﬀects of a policy change
are very much aﬀected by the mobility. Second, we show that if the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks is low, a diﬀerent paradox emerges: Subject to a
regularity condition, the equilibrium looks like a model with no mobility in
the short run, but like a model with perfect mobility in the long run. These
ﬁndings highlight the importance of second moments of moving costs (such
as the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks), and point out an advantage of
4our structural approach over reduced-form econometric approaches. These
second-moment eﬀects play a central role in our empirical analysis in Artu¸ c,
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007).
The following section lays out the structure of the model. The subsequent
section analyzes the solution to the planner’s problem of the optimal rule for
the allocation of labor, ﬁnds the key Euler condition that characterizes opti-
mality, and shows that this optimal rule is implemented by the decentralized
rational expectations equilibrium. The following section elaborates the most
important properties of the equilibrium. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss a special
case of the model that oﬀers a simple form for the equilibrium, facilitating
empirical estimation.
2 The model.
Consider a model in which production may occur in any of n ‘cells,’ where a
cell is taken to mean a particular industry in a particular place. For example,
‘pharmaceuticals in New Jersey’ might be one of the cells, as might ‘pharma-
ceuticals in Delaware’ or ‘food service in New Jersey.’ In each cell there are
a large number of competitive employers, and the value of their aggregate
output in any period t is given by xi
t = Xi(Li
t,st) ≥ 0, where Li
t denotes the
labor used in cell i in period t, and st is a state variable that could capture
the eﬀects of policy (such as trade protection, which might raise the domes-
tic price of the output), technology shocks, changes in world prices, and the
like. Assume that s follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process on some compact
state space Ss ⊂ <k for some k, where the probability distribution for st+1
conditional on st is given by a continuous density function h(st+1;st).
Assume that Xi is strictly increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable and
strictly concave in its ﬁrst argument, and also continuous in its second argu-
ment. Its ﬁrst derivative with respect to labor, denoted Xi
1, is then a contin-
uous, decreasing function of labor. We will assume that the price received by
producers in a cell does not depend on the quantity produced in that cell,5
so that Xi
1 is the value marginal product of labor curve and thus the demand
5For example, this would hold in the case of a small open economy in which the only
trade impediments are tariﬀs, so that the domestic price of each good is equal to an
exogenous world price plus a tariﬀ rate.
5curve for labor in the cell.6 We assume that the spot market for labor clears
in each cell at each date and state, so we can write the period-t wage in cell
i, wi






1(Li,s) → ∞ as Li → 0∀s. Denote the total value of output




The economy’s workers form a continuum of measure L. Each worker at
any moment is located in one of the n cells. Denote the number of workers
in cell i at the beginning of period t by Li
t, and the allocation of workers by
Lt = [L1
t,...,Ln
t ]. If a worker, say, θ ∈ [0,L], is in cell i at the beginning of
t, she will produce in that cell, collect the market wage wi
t for that cell, and
then may move to any other cell.
If a worker moves from cell i to cell j, she incurs a cost Cij ≥ 0, which
is the same for all workers and all periods, and is publicly known. This
can include, for example, moving costs, if i and j are in diﬀerent locations;
training costs (tuition and time required for industry-speciﬁc schooling, for
example) if i and j are in diﬀerent industries; and a myriad of psychic costs
as well that come from leaving a familiar location or occupation and moving
to a new one. For example, in an economy with two industries (textiles (T)
and shoes (S)) and two regions (East (E) and West (W)), suppose that cells
1, 2, 3, and 4 are T-E (textiles-East), T-W, S-E and S-W respectively. In
that case, C12, C21, C34, and C43 are costs of moving between the regions,
which include moving company services, realtors’ fees, search costs for a new
house, and the like. On the other hand, C13 and C24 are costs of moving
out of the textile industry and acquiring the human capital required to be an
eﬀective worker in the shoe industry, which could involve night school or the
time cost of making the right network connections for the new line of work.
In addition, if she is in cell i at the end of period t, the worker collects an
idiosyncratic beneﬁt εi
θ,t from being in that cell. These beneﬁts are indepen-
dently and identically distributed across individuals, cells, and dates, with
density and cumulative distribution function f and F : < 7−→ <+ respec-
tively, where f(ε) > 0∀ε. We normalize the average value
R
εf(ε)dε of the
ε’s to zero. One can think of these beneﬁts as capturing anything in one’s
personal situation that may aﬀect the direction or timing of labor market
decisions independently of wages. For example, in the example of the pre-
6This matters only for the property that the equilibrium can be represented as a dis-
torted planner’s optimum, which is useful for computation and for proof of some properties.
The exogeneity of product prices is irrelevant for the market equilibrium conditions derived
in Section 4 and for the estimation strategy outlined in Section 6.
6vious paragraph, a worker in T-E may become terribly bored of the textile
business and long for a change. This would correspond to a low value for
ε1 and ε2. On the other hand, this person may fall in love with someone
who lives in West, inducing high values for ε2 and ε4. Finally, the worker’s
family may have a member who is at the moment under the care of a trusted
local doctor, or the children may be near the end of high school, and at the
same time the worker has developed a good working rapport with her current
employer. In that case, any move would be costly, and we have low values
for ε2, ε3, and ε4.




θ,t + Cij, the ﬁrst two terms representing the idiosyncratic cost,
and the last term the common cost. Note that the idiosyncratic cost can be
negative, which is important, because that provides for gross labor ﬂows in
excess of net ﬂows. Adopt the convention that Cii = 0 for all i.
All agents have rational expectations and a common constant discount
factor β < 1, and are risk neutral. Finally, we make the following bounded-
ness assumption: Z
εF
n−1(ε)f(ε)dε < ∞. (1)
This states that the expected value of the maximum ε for any worker on
any date is ﬁnite.
Assume that all workers and employers take wages as given. In each
cell i at each date t, the wage wi




t,st) at all times. Note that the model is, in most respects, a
multi-cell version of a standard Ricardo-Viner type trade model, as in Jones
(1971), with exogenous product prices but all labor allocations and wages
throughout the economy determined by the equilibrium. The only diﬀerence
is the moving costs, which transform a static trade model into a dynamic
one. Assume that any worker who chooses to move from i to j will herself
bear both the common moving cost, Cij, and the idiosyncratic moving costs,
εi − εj.
An equilibrium then takes the form of a decision rule by which, in each
period, each worker will decide whether to stay in her cell or move to an-
other, based on the current allocation vector L of labor across sectors, the
current aggregate state s, and that worker’s own vector ε of shocks. In the
aggregate, this decision rule generates a law of motion for the evolution of
labor allocation and, by the labor market clearing condition just mentioned,
7for the wage in each sector. Given this behaviour for wages, the decision rule
must be optimal for each worker, in the sense of maximizing her expected
present discounted value of wages plus idiosyncratic beneﬁts net of moving
costs.
Let the maximized value to each worker of being in sector i when the
labor allocation is L and the state is s be denoted by b υ
i(L,s,ε), which,
of course, depends on the worker’s realized idiosyncratic shocks. Denote by
υi(L,s) the average of b υ
i(L,s,ε) across all workers in i, or in other words, the
expectation of b υ
i(L,s,ε) with respect to the vector ε. Thus, υi(L,s) can also
be interpreted as the expected value of being in cell i, conditional on L and
s, but before the worker learns her value of ε. Deﬁne the non-idiosyncratic







Each i worker will then weigh this common net beneﬁt against the idiosyn-




t will denote its ith row.























































7It may be useful to think of the narrative as follows. The state, st, is realized at the
beginning of the period. The worker then produces output and receives the wage. In the
middle of the period, the worker learns the value of the εt vector and decides whether to
move or not. The worker then enjoys ε
j
t at the end of the period, wherever she has landed.































3 The planner’s problem.
It turns out that an equilibrium of this model maximizes the expected present
discounted value of revenues net of all moving costs. This allows us to trans-
form the analysis of equilibrium into the analysis of a social planner’s prob-
lem, which is useful for a variety of reasons.8 First, we will show that any
equilibrium solves the planner’s problem, and then show that any solution
to the planner’s problem is an equilibrium, so that the set of optima and the
set of equilibria are the same.
3.1 Any equilibrium solves the planner’s problem.
Any allocation rule in this model can be summarized as a set of functions
Dij : (<n × <n
+ × Ss) 7−→ [0,1], with the interpretation that Dij(ε;L,s) is
the fraction9 of workers in cell i with idiosyncratic shocks ε = (ε1,...,εn) who




ij(ε;L,s) = 1∀i ∈ {1,...n},ε ∈ <
n,L ∈ <
n
+, and s ∈ S
s. (7)
Now consider the problem of a social planner who wishes to maximize:
8Note that we mean ‘social planner’ in a narrow sense. For example, it has already been
made clear that the state variable s can include policy variables such as trade barriers,
and these will all be treated as exogenous.
9It will become clear that this fraction will be 0 or 1 almost everywhere in each state,





















































with L0 and s0 given, with respect to the functions Dij.
The ﬁrst term in the square brackets of the objective function is simply
the value of the output in cell i, and the second term is the aggregate of
idiosyncratic beneﬁts εj, contingent on location decisions, and net of non-
idiosyncratic moving costs Cij. The constraint is simply the law of motion
for the stock of workers in each cell: Li
t+1 equals the measure of period t cell
i workers who remain there to period t+1, plus aggregate arrivals to i from
other cells.
The ﬁrst thing to observe about this problem is that, since there are
no externalities in the labor reallocation process itself, any equilibrium is
eﬃcient in the narrow sense of maximizing this planner’s objective function:
Proposition 1 Any equilibrium maximizes the planner’s problem.
The logic is as follows. Consider any equilibrium, and then compare it
with any alternative allocation rule. By revealed preference,the alternative
allocation rule must provide lower worker utility and employer proﬁts at
equilibrium wages than the equilibrium allocation; adding these together, the
wages cancel out, resulting in a lower value of (8) than under the equilibrium.
The proof is laid out in detail, along with the proofs of all other propositions,
in the appendix.
It should be pointed out that the social planner’s objective function (8) is
not, in general, actually social welfare; for example, in the event that import-
competing sectors are protected by tariﬀs, (8) does not include tariﬀ revenues,
which form part of national income and will be aﬀected by reallocations of
workers. Thus, from the point of welfare the equilibrium will not in general
be eﬃcient. The planner’s problem shown here, however, is very useful for
characterising equilibrium, as will be seen below.
103.2 The Planner’s Optimum is an Equilibrium.
We can now show that any solution to the planner’s problem described above
is also an equilibrium, completing the equivalence of the planner’s problem
and the decentralized economy.
It will be convenient to denote by m
ij
t the fraction of workers in cell i who














Given the full-support assumption made for the ε’s, it will be clear that it
will be optimal to have m
ij
t > 0∀i, j, and t.
It is easy to demonstrate that an optimal allocation rule will always take
a particular form. First, for any pair of cells, i and j, at each date and state,
there is always a threshold, e ε
ij, such that no worker in i moves to j if her
realization of εi − εjis greater than e ε
ij, and no worker in i remains in i if
her εi − εj is less than e ε
ij. Thus, e ε
ij may be interpreted as the marginal
idiosyncratic moving cost for a mover from i to j. It will later be seen that
the e ε
ij’s are equal to the εij’s of the previous section. (Not surprisingly, later
it will be seen that for an optimal allocation rule, e ε
ij must also equal the
marginal beneﬁt to having one more worker moved from i to j, and thus it
will reﬂect all available information about future labor demand in the two
cells as well as the common moving costs, the Cij’s.)
Proposition 2 Consider an optimal allocation rule {Dij}i,j∈{1,...n}. Fix i,
j 6= i, t, Lt, and st, and suppose that at that state m
ij
t ,mii









































(In other words, for any number ε0, χ(ε0) is the fraction of i workers who
have εi − εj > ε0 and move to j; and ξ(ε0) is the fraction of i workers who
have εi − εj < ε0 and remain in i.) Then there exists e ε




11We will adopt the convention that e ε
ii = 0∀i, and will denote the matrix of
these thresholds as e ε ≡ {e ε
ij}i,j∈(1,...n). An important note is that εi−εj < e ε
ij
does not ensure that the worker goes to j, because it is possible that she will
choose a third option. That point is clariﬁed by the following proposition,
which shows how all of the e ε
ij together fully determine the choices of each
worker (to within a set of measure zero).
Proposition 3 Let the conditions in the previous proposition hold, and sup-
pose that we have chosen a set of e ε
ij as described there. Then Dij(ε;Lt,st) =






(except possibly on a set of measure zero). Equivalently, Dij(ε;Lt,st) = 0 if
and only if j does not maximize {εk+e ε
ik}, except possibly on a set of measure
zero.
This allows us to write the planner’s problem in a simple way, as the
choice of a function e ε(L,s) giving the thresholds at each date and state.
The realized current-period payoﬀ to a given worker in cell i is equal to that
worker’s wage, wi
t, plus (εj −Cij), if that worker moves to cell j. Conditional
on the e ε
ik’s and on εj, the probability that this worker does move to cell j
is
Q
k6=j F(εj +e ε
ij −e ε
ik). For this reason, the realized value of the objective




















































i = (e ε
i1,...,e ε
in). We can write mi(e ε
i) = (mi1(e ε
i),...min(e ε
i)). This





















where m denotes the full matrix of gross ﬂows and a prime on a vector
indicates the transpose.
Equation (11) deﬁnes all gross ﬂows out of cell i as a function of e ε
i, with
domain {e ε
i : e ε
ij ∈ <,e ε
ii = 0} and range {mi : mij > 0,
P
j mij = 1}. The
following presents a useful property of this function.
Proposition 4 For any i, the function mi is invertible.
Thus, we can meaningfully write either the gross ﬂows as a function of
the e ε
ij’s (that is, mij(e ε
ij)) or vice versa (e ε
ij(mij)) without ambiguity. This
result is useful partly because it is helpful in deriving the planner’s ﬁrst order
condition. In addition, note that although the e ε
ij’s are useful from the point
of view of theory, they are of course unobservable to an econometrician.
However, in some cases the gross ﬂows mij themselves are observable in
conventional labor force surveys. This theorem gives us a way of inferring
the values of the unobservable e ε
ij’s by studying the observable mij’s. This is
a key to the econometric estimation of the model.
The planner, then, maximizes (9) subject to (13), given L0 and s0.
It is clear that the optimization problem presented above can be repre-
sented as a stationary dynamic programming problem, with Bellman equa-
tion:
V (L,s) = max
e ε
{U(L,s,e ε) + βEe s[V (e L,e s)|s]}, (14)
where V : <n
+ × Ss 7→ < is the value function,10 e L and e s are the next-period
values of the labor allocation vector L and the state s, with e L calculated
from L and e ε by (13), and where the expectation is taken with respect to
10Of course, values for L in the solution will range only within the set {L ∈ <n|Li ≥
0;
P
i Li = L}. It is useful, nonetheless, to deﬁne the optimization problem for all L ∈ <n;
for example, this makes the partial derivaties Vi, i = 1,...n meaningful.
13the distribution of e s, conditional on s. Standard properties of dynamic pro-
gramming problems will hold here; for example, the value function will be
diﬀerentiable in L.11 In addition:
Proposition 5 The value function is (i) non-negative; (ii) uniformly bounded
on any compact subset of the domain; and (iii) strictly concave in L.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to the e ε
ij terms can be obtained
mechanically, and rearranged to yield the following.











will hold at all times.
To interpret this condition, recall that e ε
ij denotes the value of εi − εj
for the marginal mover from i to j, and is thus the marginal idiosyncratic
cost of reallocating a worker from i to j. The left-hand side of the equation
is therefore the marginal cost of moving workers from cell i to cell j. The
right-hand side is the discounted marginal value of doing so.
In addition, the envelope condition can be applied to the Bellman equa-
tion, yielding the following.










i) is the function deﬁned in (5).
11It is straightforward to verify that the conditions of Theorem 9.10 of Lucas and Stokey
(1989, p. 266) are satisﬁed. Technically, to apply that theorem, we need to restrict the
domain for L to a bounded set such as SL(L∗) ≡ {L ∈ <n|Li ≥ 0;
P





> L, to ensure boundedness of the objective function. However, this works for
any value of L
∗
, and so is not restrictive.
14This equation has a natural interpretation. An increase in the number of
workers in cell i has three eﬀects. The ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of increased
production in cell i. The last is the beneﬁt those workers generate in cell i
if that is where they remain. The middle term, which is simply the average
value of maxj{εj + e ε
ij
t } for all workers currently in cell i, is the additional
beneﬁt owing to the ability to reallocate these workers into other cells. The
Ω function is thus, once again, a measure of the option value resulting from
the ability to move workers from one cell to another.
Now we can see that the solution to this planner’s problem is also a
market equilibrium. For each j, if we set the υj(Lt+1,st+1) function in the
right-hand side of (4) equal to the partial derivative of the planner’s value
function with respect to L
j
t+1, then (16) shows that this choice of υj function
satisﬁes each worker’s Bellman equation (4) for the wage process generated by
the planner’s rule. But then from (15) and (2), the e ε
ij functions are exactly
the same as the the optimal cutoﬀs εij for the individual worker. (From here
on in, we will drop the e ε
ij notation and simply use the εij notation.)Thus,
the planner’s solution can be replicated as a decentralized equilibrium.
Further, since we have noted the strict concavity of the planner’s value
function, we know that the optimal planner’s rule is unique, and so is equilib-
rium. Further, the derivation just completed shows that the shadow values
from the planner’s problem are equal to the lifetime utilities of the workers
in the various cells. We summarize this as follows.
Proposition 8 There is a unique equilibrium, and it is the unique allocation
rule that maximizes (9). Further, the worker payoﬀs υi(Lt,st) are equal to
the planner’s shadow values ∂V (Lt,st)/∂Li
t.
4 Properties of the equilibrium.
A number of key properties of the adjustment process can now be seen im-
mediately.
(i) Continual reallocation of workers. Consider a special case of the
model in which the state variable s is a constant. Then one can analyze
steady states of the model, which can be calculated in the following way. For
any matrix of εij’s, one can compute a matrix of gross ﬂow rates from (11),
15and holding those ﬂow rates constant one can compute steady-state values
of the labor allocation vector L (and hence wages) from (13). All of this
information can then be used to calculate the right hand side of (6) for any
i 6= j. Subtracting Cij, one can then compare the result with εij. A ﬁxed
point of this process is then a steady state. Since this computation induces a
continuous function, a steady state must exist. Label the steady state value
of the εij matrix so computed ε∗, the associated matrix of gross ﬂows m∗,
and the associated steady state labor allocation vector L∗.
The point is that even at this steady state, there will still be a constant
reallocation of workers. This is because the integrals in (11) will always
have positive values. The reason is that the workers experience idiosyncratic
shocks constantly, and each one will wish to change jobs or to move period-
ically for personal reasons. Thus, the model has no trouble accommodating
the empirical fact that gross ﬂows are much larger than net ﬂows.
(ii) Gradual adjustment. Empirically, labor adjustment tends to occur
gradually (for example, see evidence summarized by Rappaport (2000) on
the intertemporal persistence of labor ﬂows across US locations). It is easy
to see that this is a feature of the present model as well. Indeed, if the
economy is in a steady state and a shock occurs that changes the steady state
allocation, the economy will not reach the new economy in any ﬁnite time.
To see this, consider once again the special case in which s is a constant.
Suppose that the economy’s steady state allocation vector is L∗, with an
associated steady state value ε∗ of the εij matrix and associated matrix of
gross ﬂows m∗. Denote the labor allocation vector at time t by Lt, and
suppose that L0 6= L∗. Suppose that at time T, 0 < T < ∞, the economy is
in the steady state. Then at time t = T − 1, the right hand side of (6) will
take its steady state values, so the values of εij on the left hand side must be
equal to the corresponding elements of ε∗. But then (11), the matrix of gross
ﬂows m
ij
T−1 at time T − 1 must equal the values in m∗. But then working
backward from the law of motion (12), we ﬁnd that LT−1 must be equal to
L∗.12 Continuing in this logic, we ﬁnd that L0 = L∗, which is a contradiction.
Thus, the economy can move only gradually toward the steady state if it
is not already in it. The reason is again the idiosyncratic shocks. Suppose
12Consider the case with n = 2. Given L∗ and m∗, the equation (m∗)11L1
T−1 +
(m∗)21(L−L1
T−1) = (L∗)1 has a unique solution for L1
T−1 provided that (m∗)11 6= (m∗)21.
Given that m11 = Pr[ε1 > ε2+ε12] = Pr[ε1 > ε2+β[e V2−e V1]−C12] and m21 = Pr[ε1+ε21 >
ε2] = Pr[ε1 > ε2+β[e V2− e V1]+C21], (m∗)11 > (m∗)21 provided that either C12 or C21 > 0.
16that a given sector has enjoyed protection from imports for many years but
suddenly the protection is taken away, and the change is expected to be
permanent. The demand for labor in the sector drops, and the result is a
reduction in the wages it pays; workers begin to reallocate themselves to
other sectors, but each period a fraction of the workers waits because for
those workers the cost of moving is high, and it is in their interest to wait in
hopes of a lower draw for their moving costs in the near future.
(iii) Anticipatory movement of workers. In general, in this model if a
change in labor demand in some cell is foreseen, that will result in a movement
of workers before the fact. This can be seen most easily in a two-cell version
of the model. Suppose that cell 1 is an export sector and cell 2 is an import-
competing sector, which is protected by a tariﬀ. At time 0, the government
announces that it will eliminate the tariﬀ beginning in period T > 0. There
are no other changes in the economy at any time. This can be incorporated
into the model by letting st = t∀t, and by letting X2(·,s) have one functional
form when s ≥ T and a diﬀerent one when s < T. The function is shifted
down and ﬂatter when s ≥ T compared with when s < T, since the tariﬀ
elevates the domestic price of cell 2’s output, and hence the marginal value
product of cell-2 labor. Let L∗, ε∗ and m∗ denote the steady state values
for the economy with the tariﬀ in place and expected to remain permanently
(call this the ‘tariﬀ-aﬀected steady state’), and suppose that L0 = L∗. It
can be seen quickly that no matter how large T is, the adjustment begins
immediately, in the sense that because of the announcement the gross ﬂows
even in period 0 are already diﬀerent from m∗.
To make the argument, it helps to consider two diﬀerent stationary mod-
els, each with Ss a singleton, so that we can drop s as an argument in the
value function. The ﬁrst model (the ‘starred’ model) is one in which there
is a tariﬀ in place permanently, and the second model (the ‘double-starred’
model) is one in which there is never any tariﬀ. The values L∗, e ε
∗, and m∗,
then, describe the steady-state of the ‘starred’ model. Denote the revenue
functions for cell 2 for the two models by X2∗ and X2∗∗, respectively. Apart
from these revenue functions, the two models are identical. Denote the value
functions by V ∗ and V ∗∗ respectively, while V denotes the value function for
the model with a tariﬀ up to time T followed by free trade. The following
property is easy to verify.
Proposition 9 Assume that X2∗
1 (L2) > X2∗∗
1 (L2) for all L2 > 0. Then
dV ∗(L − L2,L2)/dL2 > dV ∗∗(L − L2,L2)/dL2 for all L2 ∈ (0,L] (call this
17the ‘strong derivative property’).
Clearly, V (Lt,st) = V ∗∗(Lt) for t ≥ T. The ﬁrst-order condition at









where a tilde denotes a next-period value. Given that ε21
t+1 = −ε12
t+1−C12−C21
at all times (see (15)), we can think of ε21
t+1 as a decreasing function of ε12
t+1.
Thus, an increase in ε12 will increase m12 and decrease m21, increasing the
next-period value of L2. By the concavity of V ∗∗, this will decrease the value
of the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition. Thus, the right-hand side
of the condition is a downward-sloping curve in ε12, while the left hand side
is an upward-sloping line in ε12. As a result, for a given value of L2, anything
that shifts the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition down will result in
a lower value of ε12. Therefore, by Proposition 9, the solution to the ﬁrst-
order condition at time T −1 will yield a lower value of ε12, and thus a higher
value of ε21, along with a lower value for the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order
condition, than would be chosen for the same value of L2
T−1 in the ‘starred’
model. Using the envelope condition (16), this implies that
















T−1 ∈ (0,L]. Applying this same logic recursively back to t = 0, we
conclude that the value of ε12
0 (and hence the value of m12
0 ) that is chosen
is below the value m∗12 that would have been chosen in the steady state of
the ‘starred’ model. But that demonstrates the point: The response to the
future announced policy begins at the moment it is announced.
The interpretation of this result has to do once again with idiosyncratic
shocks. Even if wages are currently equal in the two sectors, if a worker
knows that an event will occur shortly in the future that will depress wages
in sector 2 for a long time afterward, and if that worker happens to have low
moving costs at the moment, understanding that her moving costs may not
be so low later on, she may simply jump at the opportunity to move now.
It should be noted that anticipatory movements of labor are also a feature
of Mussa-type models, as studied in detail by Dehejia (2003). However, in
those models, the anticipatory behavior is a result of the existence of a re-
training sector with rising marginal costs, while in the current model it arises
purely from the presence of time-varying idiosyncratic moving costs. Antic-
ipatory reorientation of an economy associated with a forthcoming change
18in trade policy is an important phenomenon empirically, as documented for
the case of accessions to trade blocs by Freund and McLaren (1999). This
mechanism provides an additional potential source for it.
(iv) Anticipatory changes in wages. This is an immediate corollary to
the point just made. In the example discussed above, if workers begin to
leave sector 2 immediately as soon as the planned future liberalization is
announced, then clearly wages in sector 2 will begin to rise right away and
wages in sector 1 will begin to fall right away. Of course, sector 2 wages will
then drop abruptly at the date of the actual liberalization, and continue to
adjust after that.
This is important for a number of reasons. First, in doing empirical
work on the relationship between tariﬀs and wages, the issue of timing
could be extremely important. Simply looking at a pair of snapshots taken
before and after a liberalization, for example, could miss a large part of the
actual movement in wages; further, in the simple story just told, if the pre-
liberalization data were collected very shortly before the liberalization, the
empirical results would overstate the downward eﬀect of the liberalization on
wages in the aﬀected sector. Second, these anticipatory eﬀects on wages can
provide a motive for gradualism in trade policy. If the government wishes to
compensate the workers harmed by a liberalization but cannot do so through
lump-sum transfers, announcing the policy change in advance and allowing
these adjustment mechanisms to do their work can in principle be an eﬀective
way of doing so. This is a point made by Dehejia (2003) in the context of
a Mussa-type model. In the context of this model, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2007) show that suﬃcient delay will make all workers unanimous in either
supporting or opposing the trade liberalization, and show the conditions
under which they will unite in favor of open trade rather than against it.
Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (forthcoming) study simulations to show
what magnitude of delay is required and what the time-path of adjustment
looks like.
(v) Persistent wage diﬀerentials in long-run equilibrium. A feature of
the model that is not obvious is that it generally predicts wage diﬀerentials
across cells even in the steady state.
Consider, once again, a version with two cells and with s constant. Sup-
pose that C12 = C21, and suppose that there is a steady state in which
w2 ≥ w1. Observe that if in that steady state L1 > L2, then we must
have m21 > m12. From (11), this implies that ε21 > ε12. Recalling that
Ω(εi) = Eε[maxj{εj + εij}] , this implies that Ω(ε2) > Ω(ε1). From (4) ap-
19plied recursively, that means that υ2 > υ1. But from (2), this implies that
ε21 < ε12, a contradiction. Thus, in order to have L1 > L2 in the steady
state, we must also have w1 > w2. Thus, in the steady state a sector will
have a higher wage than the other if and only if it has more workers than the
other. This conclusion contrasts sharply with the behavior of a Mussa-type
model, in which factor returns are equalized across sectors in the long run
(see Mussa (1978)).
The explanation is as follows. Suppose that both cells had the same wage
in the steady state, but cell 1 was ten times the size of cell 2. In that case,
workers would be indiﬀerent between the two cells apart from idiosyncratic
eﬀects. In each period, a certain fraction of the workers in either cell would
realize negative moving costs, which could be interpreted as boredom with
the current job or location or a desire to move to the other cell to realize some
personal opportunity. With the wages identical, an identical fraction of the
workers in each cell would wish to change sectors in each period. However,
this would imply a much larger number of workers moving from 1 to 2 than
vice versa. The result would be net migration toward 2, which would push
down the wage in cell 2 and pull up the wage in cell 1. The wage diﬀerential
thus created would then tend to slow down migration out of 1 and speed
up migration out of 2, and this process would continue until the aggregate
number of workers moving in each direction would be equal.
These eﬀects, which might be called ‘frictional’ wage diﬀerentials, thus
provide a new reason for persistent intersectoral or geographic wage diﬀer-
ences, quite independent of compensating diﬀerentials, eﬃciency wages and
union eﬀects, which have been emphasized in the labor economics literature.
It should also be emphasized that these eﬀects occur even if the average
moving costs Cij are all equal to zero. The persistent wage diﬀerentials are
induced entirely by the variance in idiosyncratic eﬀects.
(vi) National income is not maximized. The previous point should make
it clear that equilibrium in this model does not in general maximize Gross
Domestic Product, either in the short run or in the long run, because the
marginal value products of labor are not equalized across cells. This is true
even under free trade, when Proposition 1 ensures that the equilibrium max-
imizes social welfare. The point is that income and consumption are not all
that matter to the economic agents in the model, and their labor allocation
decisions depend (and ought to depend) on their idiosyncratic preference
shocks as well as on income opportunities. This point is explored in the
two-sector version of the model in Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007), where it
20is shown that the equilibrium produces more evenly-sized industries in the
steady state than what would maximize GDP.
(vii) Limiting behaviour as idiosyncratic shocks become important. There
is a sense in which the aggregate behaviour of the model when idiosyncratic
shocks are very important mimics the aggregate behaviour of a static model
with no mobility at all. This underlines how crucial it is to take account of
gross ﬂows, as is being done here, and to estimate the structural parameters
of the mobility costs, because using a reduced-form econometric approach
could produce normative conclusions that would be seriously in error.
To make this point, consider a class of distributions for the εi’s indexed by
δ > 0 in the following way. For a particular distribution function F1 and as-
sociated density f1, the distribution function Fδ and density fδ are deﬁned by
Fδ(ε) = F1(ε/δ) and fδ(ε) = f1(ε/δ)/δ. Thus, Fδ is a radial mean-preserving
spread of F1 for δ > 1; the probability that ε ≤ y with the distribution F1
is equal to the probability that ε ≤ δy with the distribution Fδ. With this
family of distributions, if δ is very small, then idiosyncratic eﬀects are triv-
ial most of the time, but as δ becomes large, idiosyncratic eﬀects become
more important and can eventually dwarf wages in their eﬀect on workers’
decisions. The asymptotic eﬀects of increases in δ are summarized in the
following.
Proposition 10 When the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is given by
the family Fδ, as δ → ∞ the matrix of gross ﬂows mij converges uniformly in
equilibrium over the whole state space to a matrix each of whose components
is equal to 1/n.
Thus, if δ is very large, regardless of the labor demand shocks, workers
would always be approximately evenly distributed across the cells of the
economy. In this extreme case, which is certainly not realistic but a useful
thought experiment to make a point, the number of workers in each cell would
be completely insensitive to, for example, the elimination of tariﬀs, and all
of the adjustment would occur in the form of changes in wages. Aggregate
data would suggest that each industry has in eﬀect a captive labor force,
and the cost of the elimination of a tariﬀ on textiles, for example, would be
borne entirely by workers in the textile sector, while all other workers would
enjoy a net beneﬁt through lower textile prices. However, this would be
quite wrong. In such an economy, far from being captive, workers would be
very footloose, and a typical textile worker would face only a 1/n chance of
21continuing in the textile sector next period. Therefore, particularly if n is
large, the cost borne by the textile workers would be very low; for most of
such a worker’s future career, she would be in other sectors, enjoying the
beneﬁt of lower prices. It may in fact be a Pareto-improving liberalization,
while the reduced-form approach would mistakenly conclude that one sector
of workers would be badly hurt and would bitterly oppose the liberalization.
Thus, a focus on gross ﬂows in equilibrium, and attention to the variance of
mobility costs as well as their means, are, in principle, crucial to getting the
normative conclusions right.
This message comes through in the empirical analysis of this model in
Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007), in which it is shown that the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks implied by US labor market data is very high. Indeed,
simulations of the estimated parameters show that liberalization that results
in a lower wage for an import-competing sector both in the short run and in
the long run can indeed be Pareto-improving, a ﬁnding sharply at odds with
what a model without gross ﬂows would imply.
(viii) Limiting behavior as idiosyncratic shocks become small.
We also want to know how the model behaves when idosyncratic shocks
are small. Consider the model with n = 2 and no aggregate shocks. Recall-
ing the notation of the previous section, consider a distribution F1 for the
idiosyncratic shocks and the family of distributions Fδ that it induces, with
associated densities f1 and fδ. This time we will let the variance become
inﬁnitesimally small, or in other words consider the limit as δ → 0. Denote
the steady-state values of the key variables by an overbar (and denote the
steady-state value of εij by ε
ij). Then we can derive both a short-run prop-
erty and a long-run property – roughly, in the limit the model acts like a
static model in the short run and a frictionless model in the long run. First,
the short-run property:
Proposition 11 Let Ss be a singleton (and henceforth suppress the argu-
ment s.) Fix the initial value L1
0 of the cell-1 labor force, and consider the
equilibrium timepath {L1
t(δ)}∞
t=1 starting from that initial state conditional
on the value δ. Then {L1
t(δ)}∞
t=1 converges pointwise to {L1
t(0)}∞
t=1 as δ → 0.
Remark 1 Since there is no reason for gradual adjustment in the model with
no idiosyncratic shocks, the sequence {L1
t(0)}∞
t=1 will clearly be a constant
sequence. In other words, there is either no adjustment (L1
0(0) = L1
1(0)) or
there is a one-time adjustment (L1
0(0) 6= L1
1(0)) that lands immediately in a
new steady state.
22The second property concerns the steady state. Under a regularity con-
dition for the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks that we will see is satisﬁed
by some important distributions, we derive a strong limiting result on the
diﬀerence between the payoﬀ to a worker in the two cells, (υ2 − υ1).
Proposition 12 Assume that f1 is logconcave. Then, holding constant all
parameters of the model except for δ, if we denote the long-run steady-state
value of υj as υj, β(υ2 − υ1) → (C12 − C21)/2 as δ → 0.
The basic point is that if the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks is small,
then the long-run elasticity of intersectoral labor supply is large. This is
because the long-run allocation of workers to the two sectors is determined
by the ratio of m12 to m21, not by their diﬀerence. As the variance of the
idiosyncratic shocks becomes small, both m12 and m21 become small, and
the ratio becomes sensitive to small variations in the relative attractiveness
(v2 − v1) of the two sectors.
Some comments are in order. First, this result shows clearly that there is
a discontinuity in the behavior of the system as indiosyncratic shocks become
small. If there are no idiosyncratic shocks, the system has a range of steady
states, which can be wide if the values of Cij are large, including steady
states with large intersectoral wage diﬀerences. However, with even a tiny
positive variance in idiosyncratic shocks, the steady state is unique,13 and if
C12 = C21, wages and welfare are perfectly arbitraged across sectors.
Second, there is a velvet-rope eﬀect: If moving costs are asymmetric, it is
the sector that is diﬃcult to enter that is the most attractive in the steady
state. That is to say, if C12 > C21, then υ2 > υ1 and vice versa.
Third, if moving costs are symmetric, steady-state wages will be equated
across the sectors no matter how high the moving costs are, provided only
that the variance of the moving costs is low enough (and not zero). In this
limiting case, it is the diﬀerence between the Cij’s that determines long-run
relative intersectoral wages, not their absolute level.
Fourth, it is clear that for a positive value of the Cij’s, as the idiosyncratic
variance becomes vanishingly small, so does the level of steady-state gross
ﬂows.14,15
13This point is analyzed in detail in Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007), Section 3.
14Using the notation of the proofs of Propositions 11 and 12 in the appendix, this is
because Gδ(−(C12 + C21)/2) → 0 as δ → 0.
15In the event that C12 = C21 = 0, the limiting rate of gross ﬂows is one half in each
direction.
23Finally, it must be emphasized that this is a steady-state result. In gen-
eral, if trade is opened up, even where workers in both sectors have the same
steady-state utility, the lifetime utility of the workers initially in the two
sectors will be aﬀected very diﬀerently. In fact, paradoxically, in the case in
which the idiosyncratic variance is vanishingly small, leading to perfect arbi-
trage between the two sectors in the long run, the path to the adjustment will
become extremely slow,16 so that the transition path becomes all the more
important. In fact, from (24), it can be seen that the planner’s objective
function becomes in the limit as δ → 0 identical to the objective function for
a model with no idiosyncratic shocks, which with positive Cij’s will exhibit
large diﬀerences in payoﬀs to workers in diﬀerence sectors in response to a
trade shock.
Therefore, a model with a small but positive idiosyncratic variance and
large symmetric moving costs will tend to act like a model with no moving
costs in the steady state, but its normative and dynamic properties on the
way to the steady state will be very diﬀerent. Once again, the steady state
is a poor guide to policy.
5 A special case, and empirical implementa-
tion.
The model takes a particularly tractable form when a judicious choice of
functional form is made. Assume that the εi
t are generated from an extreme-
value distribution with cumulative distribution function given by:
F(ε) = exp(−exp(−ε/ν − γ)),











16Roughly, the relative size of oﬀ-diagonal elements of the gross ﬂows matrix m de-
termines the long-run allocation of labor, but the absolute size of the diagonal elements
determines the speed of adjustment.
24(See Patel, Kapadia, and Owen (1976).) Note that while we make the natural
assumption that the ε’s be mean-zero, we do not impose any restrictions on
the variance, leaving ν (which is positively related to the variance) as a free
parameter to be estimated.

















t) = −ν lnm
ii
t . (18)
Both these expressions make intuitive sense. The ﬁrst says that the greater
the expected net (of moving costs) beneﬁts of moving to j, the larger should
be the observed ratio of movers (from i to j) to stayers. Moreover, holding
constant the (average) expected net beneﬁts of moving, a higher variance of
the idiosyncratic cost shocks lowers the compensating migratory ﬂow if the
average net beneﬁt is positive and raises it if they are negative.
The second expression says that the greater the probability of remaining
in cell i, the lower the value of having the option to move from cell i.17 More-
over, as one might expect, when the variance of the idiosyncratic component
of moving costs increases, so too does the value of having the option to move.















































This is the basis of the empirical approach in Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and
McLaren (2007), where the parameters in (19) are estimated with data on
gross ﬂows and wages, using standard Generalized Method of Moment tech-
niques. The results indicate surprisingly high levels of both the mean moving
costs Cij and their variances. This implies a somewhat sluggish adjustment
of the labor market to a trade shock, and a very prominent role for option
values in evaluating the net beneﬁt to workers.
17Note that 0 < mii
t < 1, so Ω(εi
t) = −ν lnmii
t > 0.
256 Conclusion.
This paper has articulated an equilibrium model of labor adjustment to ex-
ternal shocks, which has been designed to be useful for trade policy analysis
and to be empirically estimable. The key features are an inﬁnite horizon in
which all workers have rational expectations; the possibility of shocks to labor
demand in a sector (as caused, for example, by a change in trade policy) or
in a geographic location; publicly observable costs of moving or of changing
sectors; and time-varying, idiosyncratic private costs as well. We have shown
that the equilibrium solves a particular social planner’s dynamic program-
ming problem, which facilitates analysis of the equilibrium. In addition, the
equilibrium exhibits gross ﬂows in excess of net ﬂows (and indeed, constant
movement of workers even in a steady state), which is an important feature
of empirical labor adjustment; gradual adjustment to a shock; anticipatory
adjustment to an announced policy change; and persistent ‘frictional’ wage
diﬀerentials across geographic locations or sectors, which will exist even if
the average moving costs are zero. We have also shown, by studying limiting
cases of the variance of idiosyncratic shocks, why the variance of those shocks
is potentially so important to the normative conclusions in applied work.
Finally, it is shown that the key equilibrium condition takes a particularly
simple form when the functional forms are chosen in a particular way, making
the econometric estimation of the parameters of the model feasible with data
on gross ﬂows and wages over time for a particular economy, the subject of
an accompanying project reported in Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007).
This model is further developed in a number of companion papers. Artu¸ c,
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) studies quantitative properties of the model
through simulations, focussing on the eﬀects of delay in trade liberalization;
and Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) studies dynamics and political-economy
implications of the model in a simpliﬁed version with two industries.
7 Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, it is useful to rewrite the problem in
terms of histories of shocks. Fix the initial allocation of labor L0. For any
date t ≥ 0, deﬁne the public history variable Ht ≡ (s0,s1,...st), and for any
26worker, deﬁne the history of private shocks H0
t ≡ (ε0,ε1,...εt). Then the
allocation rule Dij can be represented as functions of these history variables
as follows. The rule for worker reallocation can then be written as a function
d
ij
t such that d
ij
t (Ht,εt) = 1 if a worker who is in cell i after aggregate history
Ht−1 and who faces idiosyncratic shocks εt moves to j, and d
ij
t (Ht,εt) = 0
otherwise. From this rule, we can deduce the allocation of labor Lt at date t
from Ht−1, and for any worker, we can deduce the location of that worker at
date t from Ht−1 and H0
t−1. We can summarize this information by writing
the the vector-valued function Lt(Ht−1) for the allocation of labor, and the
vector-valued function πt(Ht−1;H0
t−1;i) for the individual worker’s location,
where π
j
t = 1 if a worker in cell i at date t = 0 is in cell j at date t, and
π
j
t = 0 otherwise. (Of course, π0 is a function of i alone, with πi
0(i) = 1 and
π
j
0(i) = 0 if i 6= j. For convenience, we can write Ht = H0
t = ∅ for t < 0.)
Now suppose that the functions e Dij are an equilibrium allocation rule,




t (Ht,εt) respectively. Consider any alternative feasible rule b Dij, with
induced b Lt, b πt, and b d
ij
t .
































(Note that the wages in both sides of (20) are the same.) In other words,
each worker maximizes her lifetime utility, taking the time-path of wages as
given.
At the same time, by spot-market clearing, the incomes of employers are
maximized with respect to Li
t in each sector in each period taking the wage























Multiplying (20) by Li
0 and adding (20) for i = 1,...n and adding the








t, we have that (8) is
larger for e Dij than for b Dij.
Proof of Proposition 2. Clearly χ(ε0) is decreasing and continuous,
with χ(ε0) → 0 as ε0 → ∞ and χ(ε0) → m
ij
t as ε0 → −∞. Clearly ξ(ε0) is
increasing and continuous, with ξ(ε0) → mii
t as ε0 → ∞ and χ(ε0) → 0 as
ε0 → −∞. Thus, we can ﬁnd an e ε
∗ such that χ(e ε
∗) = ξ(e ε
∗). If χ(e ε
∗) = 0,
we are done. If not, then we have a positive mass of i workers who have
εi − εj < e ε
∗ and who remain in i, and an equal mass of i workers who have
εi − εj > e ε
∗ and who move to j. Clearly, if we simply reversed their roles,
making the movers stay and the stayers move, the next-period allocation of
labor would be unchanged, and the total surplus would be higher. Therefore,
the original allocation rule could not have been optimal.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an optimal allocation. Suppose that
for some i, j, k, Lt, st, and some set A(1) ⊆ <n with positive probability
measure, εj + e ε
ij > εk + e ε
ik and yet Dik(ε;Lt,st) > 0∀ε ∈ A(1). Without
loss of generality, assume that for all ε ∈ A(1), εj +e ε
ij − (εk +e ε
ik) ≥ ∆ >
0. For any positive N, consider the ball of radius 1/N around the point
ε = (−e ε
i1,−e ε
i2,...,−e ε
in), and note that within such a ball will be points
for which the expression εi + e ε
ii − εi0 − e ε
ii0
= εi − εi0 − e ε
ii0
is negative for
all i0, points for which it is positive for all i0, and points with every other
possible combination of signs (note that at the center of the ball εi + e ε
ii −
εi0 − e ε
ii0
= εi − εi0 − e ε
ii0
= 0∀i0) . For N = 1,...,∞, deﬁne a subset
of such a ball, B(N) ⊆ <n, by B(N) = {ε : εi − εi0 > e ε
ii0
∀i0 6= j;εi −
εj < e ε
ij;andmaxi0

 εi0 +e ε
ii0   < 1/N}. (Note that at the center of the ball,
εi0 +e ε
ii0
= 0∀i0.) By the previous proposition, Dij = 1 everywhere on B(N)
for all N. Deﬁne a sequence A(N) of subsets of A(1), where for each N the





in A(N) who go to k is equal to the smaller of p(1) and the measure of
B(N). For large enough N, we will have εj + e ε
ij − (εk + e ε
ik) < ∆ for all
ε ∈ B(N), and a measure of workers in A(N) going to k that is equal to the
measure of workers in B(N) who go to j. But then for every worker in A(N),
εj − εk ≥ e ε
ik −e ε
ij + ∆, and the worker moves to k; while for every worker
in B(N), εj − εk < e ε
ik −e ε
ij + ∆, and the worker moves to j. Clearly, if for
ε ∈ A(N), we simply reduced Dik(ε;Lt,st) to 0 and increased Dij(ε;Lt,st)
by Dik(ε;Lt,st); and if for ε ∈ B(N), we reduced Dij(ε;Lt,st) to 0 and
increased Dik(ε;Lt,st) to 1; then the total number of workers going to each
28cell would be unchanged. However, a positive mass of workers in A(N) and
in B(N) will have reversed their roles; B(N) workers with lower values of
εj − εk now move to k and the A(N) workers with higher values of εj − εk
move to j. Thus, the next-period allocation of labor would be unchanged,
and the total surplus would be higher. Therefore, the original allocation rule
could not have been optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4. Recall the gross ﬂow function deﬁned by (11).
It is convenient to deﬁne a truncated version of this function. First, let x−k
denote the vector made by deleting the kth element of x (if x has fewer than k
elements, x−k = x). After deleting one or more elements of a vector, continue
to index the remaining elements in the same way, so, for example, if x ∈ <n
and n > i, then (x−i)n = xn. In addition, for any vector x, let x[k] denote
the vector made up of its ﬁrst k elements; let x−[k] denote the vector made
up of all of its elements after the kth.
Then, for any i, deﬁne mi
offdiag : <n−1 → {x ∈ (0,1)n−1 :
P
j xj < 1},
with mi
offdiag(εi
−i) = (mi(εi))−i. Thus, mi
offdiag deﬁnes the gross ﬂows out
of i, but not the residual category of i workers who stay in i, and it deﬁnes
them as a function of εi
−i.
















































if i0 = j.







































which is the Jacobian of the mi
offdiag function, is a dominant diagonal matrix
with positive elements on the main diagonal and negative elements oﬀ the
main diagonal. This implies that it has an inverse (see Theorem 1 in McKen-
zie (1960)), and that the inverse has only positive elements (see Theorem 4 in
McKenzie (1960)). This information is useful in the remainder of the proof.
Now, ﬁx i. The proof will proceed by induction. Deﬁne the induction
hypothesis P(n0) for n0 ≤ n as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 P(n0): For any εi ∈ <n and for any m∗ ∈ (0,1)n with
P
j(m∗)j =




In other words, P(n0) says that for any value of the εij’s from j = n0 + 1
to n and for any set of desired gross ﬂows m∗ from j = 1 to n0, we can ﬁnd
exactly one choice of εij’s from j = 1 to n0 (denoted ˆ ε) that will provide
exactly those desired gross ﬂows. Where P(n0) holds, it will be useful to
write the b ε as a function: b ε((εi
−i)−[n0];(m∗
−i)[n0]).
Of course, the statement to be proved is simply P(n). It is clear that P(1)
holds, since by (11) mi1 is continuous and strictly increasing in εi1, mi1 → 0
as εi1 → −∞ and mi1 → 1 as εi1 → ∞. Thus, the only task remaining is to
show that P(n0) implies P(n0 + 1).
Suppose that P(n0) holds, and so the b ε function deﬁned above exists.
Fix (ε∗
−i)−[n0] and (m∗
−i)[n0]. Consider the ﬁrst n0 elements of the ˜ mi function
as a function of (εi)[n0], holding (εi)−[n0] constant. By (22), the derivatives
of this function form an n0-square dominant diagonal matrix with positive
elements on the main diagonal and negative elements oﬀ it. This implies
that the inverse of that matrix exists and that it has all positive elements
(see Theorems 1 and 4 in McKenzie (1960), respectively). This inverse is,
then, the Jacobian of the b ε function with respect to (m∗
−i)[n0].
















30the ﬂow vector resulting from a given choice for εi,n0+1, given that εi,k have
been ﬁxed for k > n0 + 1 and that εi,k for k ≤ n0 are adjusted to keep the
ﬁrst n0 elements of the ﬂow vector equal to (m∗
−i)[n0]. The µ function is


















The left hand side of this equation is an n0+1-square matrix of derivatives
multiplied by an (n0 +1)-by-1 vector. The right hand side is an (n0 +1)-by-1
vector that has n0 zeroes, due to the deﬁnition of the ˆ ε function. Once again,
by the properties of dominant diagonal matrices, the inverse of the ﬁrst
matrix on the left hand side exists and has only positive elements. There-
fore, every element of the vector on the left-hand side has the same sign as
dµn0+1/dεi,n0+1. One of the elements of the vector on the left-hand side is 1,
which is positive; therefore, dµn0+1/dεi,n0+1 > 0. Further, we conclude that
dˆ ε/dεi,n0+1 is positive in each element.
From (11), we can see that µn0+1 → 0 as ¯ εi,n0+1 → −∞. (For example, as
¯ εi,n0+1 → −∞, F(εn0+1 + εi,n0+1 − εi,n) → 0 pointwise, so by the dominated
convergence theorem mi,n0+1 → 0.) Further, µk → 0 as ¯ εi,n0+1 → ∞ for k >







as ¯ εi,n0+1 → ∞.



















Finally, since dµn0+1/dεi,n0+1 > 0, as noted above, this value of ¯ εi,n0+1 is
unique. Thus, P(n0 + 1) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5. Claim (i) is straightforward, since the planner
could always set Dii ≡ 1 for all i, which would ensure a non-negative value
for (8) since Cii ≡ 0. Claim (ii) follows from the continuity of the value
function (trivially implied by its diﬀerentiability).
The proof of claim (iii) is as follows. Return to the original form of the
problem, (8). Fix L∗ > L, and deﬁne SL(L∗) ≡ {L ∈ <n|Li ≥ 0;
P
i Li ∈
[0,L∗]}. If L∗∗ > L∗, it is easy to see that for states in SL(L∗) × Ss, the
value function that solves the Bellman equation with the state space limited
31to SL(L∗)×Ss will agree with the function that solves it with the state space
SL(L∗∗) × Ss. Thus, if we show that the Bellman equation derived for any
ﬁnite L∗ is concave in L, we are done. That will now be demonstrated.























This is the second term in the objective function. In addition, deﬁne the








i(L,s) + B(L,D) + βEe s[W(e L,e s)|s]},
where e L is determined from L and D by (12). A ﬁxed point of T will be
a solution to the Bellman equation, and by the usual logic of discounted
dynamic programming, T is a contraction mapping, so that there is a unique
ﬁxed point, and it can be found as the limit of T k(W) as k → 0 for any
bounded function W.
Now consider a bounded and concave function W, and consider two diﬀer-
ent points in the state space, a = (La,s) and b = (Lb,s). In the optimization
required in the deﬁnition of T(W), denote the allocation rule chosen at state
a by Da, and the induced next-period labor allocation by e La, and similarly
use Db and e Lb for state b. Now, consider the point c = αLa +(1−α)Lb, for
some α ∈ [0,1]. Construct the allocation rule:
D
ij











Since Dc is a weighted average of Da and Db within each cell, it satisﬁes (7)
















































= αB(La,Da) + (1 − α)B(Lb,Db).
32Further, the next-period labor allocation vector that it induces is equal










i(Lc,s) + αB(La,Da) + (1 − α)B(Lb,Db) + βEe s[W(e Lc,e s)|s]}
> αT(W)(La,s) + (1 − α)T(W)(Lb,s).
The ﬁrst inequality follows from optimization, and the fact that Dc is
feasible. The last inequality follows from the concavity of Xi and W, and
from the fact that Da is optimal at point a and Db is optimal at point b.
Therefore, if W is bounded and concave, so will be T k(W) for any k,
and so must be the limit function, which is the true value function V . This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Note that the derivative of U with respect to



















































Using the change of variables ε = εj − εii0
























33(The equality follows, ﬁrst, because the term in parentheses equals zero when
j = i0, so we can lift the restriction that j 6= i0 without aﬀecting the equation;
and second, the sum of derivatives of the ﬂows across all cells resulting from
a change in εii0















Deﬁne the function εi
offdiag as the inverse of the function mi
offdiag deﬁned
in the beginning of the proof of Proposition (4). Then the ﬁrst order condition















































takes a value of 1 if j equals 1, −1 if j equals i, and zero otherwise. Thus,

























This equation says that the marginal cost of moving a worker from i to 1
is equal at the optimum to the expected discounted marginal beneﬁt of doing
so. This can be repeated for any pair of cells i and j with i 6= j, to yield
the indicated condition.


























ij ∂ ˜ V
∂e Lj,





























































This is the indicated condition.
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose that W ∗ and W ∗∗ are two bounded,
concave value functions with dW ∗(L−L2,L2)/dL2 ≥ dW ∗∗(L−L2,L2)/dL2
for all L2 ∈ (0,L] (call this the ‘weak derivative property’), and let T be
the operator on value functions deﬁned by the planner’s Bellman equation.
Then we claim that T(W ∗) and T(W ∗∗) are both bounded and continuous
with dT(W ∗)(L−L2,L2)/dL2 ≥ dT(W ∗∗)(L−L2,L2)/dL2 for all L2 ∈ (0,L].
The boundedness of T(W ∗) and T(W ∗∗) is immediate, and their concavity
can be proven with the same argument as was used in the proof of Proposition
5. For the derivative property, note that the ﬁrst-order condition for solving








where a tilde indicates next-period variables computed from the gross ﬂow
matrix. Given that ε21
t+1 = −ε12
t+1 − C12 − C21 at all times (see (15)), we
can think of ε21
t+1 as a decreasing function of ε12
t+1. Thus, an increase in ε12
will increase m12 and decrease m21, increasing the next-period value of L2.
35By the concavity of W ∗∗, this will decrease the value of the right-hand side
of the ﬁrst-order condition. Thus, the right-hand side of the condition is a
downward-sloping curve in ε12. At the same time, the left hand side of the
condition is an upward-sloping line in ε12. As a result, for a given value of
L2, anything that shifts the right-hand side of the ﬁrst-order condition down
will result in a lower value of ε12 . Therefore, for a given value of L2, the
solution to the ﬁrst-order condition with W ∗∗ will yield a lower value of ε12,
and thus a higher value of ε21, along with a lower value for the right-hand
side of the ﬁrst-order condition, than will the solution with W ∗. But then
applying the envelope condition (16) to T(W ∗) and T(W ∗∗), it is clear that
the weak derivative property holds for T(W ∗) and T(W ∗∗). This proves the
claim.
Therefore, from any initial bounded and concave W ∗ and W ∗∗ satisfying
the weak derivative property, T k(W ∗) and T k(W ∗∗) will also be bounded and
concave and satisfy the derivative property for any k, and so the property
holds in the limit as k → ∞. Thus, the value functions V ∗ and V ∗∗ also
satisfy the weak derivative property.
From here there is one step required to show that the value functions
satisfy the strong derivative property. Considering the ﬁrst-order conditions
again, this time for V ∗ and V ∗∗ respectively, the curve-shifting logic used
in the proof of the claim above shows that for a given value of L2, the
value of ε12 chosen with V ∗ will be at least as great as that chosen with
V ∗∗. Therefore, again looking at the envelope condition (16) and noting
that X2∗
1 (L2) > X2∗∗
1 (L2) for all L2 > 0, the strong derivative condition is
immediate.































δ denotes the gross ﬂow from i to j as calculated from (11) using
the distribution Fδ, and, as before εii = 0∀i. We can rewrite this function
























36where b ε is an n-square matrix of real numbers with b ε
ii = 0. In other words,






































































































Each of these Ai functions takes a unique maximum at b ε
i = 0. To see
this, consider a sample of n independent draws from the distribution F1, and
call the realized values ε1,...εn. The function Ai(b ε
i) is the expectation of
the j∗th of these, where j∗ is the value of j that maximizes {b ε
ij+εj}. On the
other hand, Ai(0) is simply the expectation of the highest of the εj’s. Thus,
Ai(0) must be higher.















37The maximization of (9) is, of course, equivalent to maximizing the expected
present discounted value of Uδ(L,s,b ε)/δ. Further, we can speak in terms
of the optimal choice of b ε in each state instead of the optimal choice of ε
without making any substantive diﬀerence.
Fix ∆ > 0. Let b ∆ =
P
i LiAi(0) − sup|b ε|≥∆
P
i LiAi(b ε) > 0, where |b ε|
indicates the absolute value of the element of b ε that is farthest from zero.
(Think of b ∆ as the minimum loss from having b ε a distance ∆ away from its
optimum of 0.) The point will be to demonstrate that if δ is large enough,
we will have |b ε| < ∆, regardless of the value of L and s.
The terms in the square brackets of (23) are uniformly bounded on the
feasible domain, so the last term (the square brackets divided by δ) can be
made uniformly arbitrarily small by choosing δ suﬃciently high. Choose δ
high enough that those two terms are always less than (1−β)b ∆/2 in absolute
value. Now, suppose that the optimal rule for choosing b ε has at some state
(L∗,s∗) a value of b ε with |b ε| > ∆. Now, replace that rule with one that is
identical except that at that state, and at all other states after that state has
once been reached, b ε is set equal to 0. In the ﬁrst period in which the change
takes eﬀect, that would increase the value of the ﬁrst term of (23) by at least
b ∆. Thereafter, it could not reduce the value of that term, because withb ε = 0,
that term would be at its maximum. On the other hand, in the ﬁrst period of
the change or in any subsequent period, the second two terms together could
fall by at most (1 − β)b ∆/2, so the expected present discounted value of the
reduction in those terms would be at most [(1−β)b ∆/2]/(1−β) = b ∆/2. Thus,
the change in the value of the objective function due to the change in rule
evaluated at the state (L∗,s∗) would be at least equal to b ∆− b ∆/2 = b ∆/2 > 0.
This contradicts the assumption that the initial rule was optimal.
Thus, we have that b ε as a function of L and s converges uniformly to the


















we conclude that m
ij
1 (b ε(L,s)) converges to the constant 1/n uniformly as
δ → ∞.
38Proof of Proposition 11.
Following the notation of Theorem 12, the objective function can be writ-
ten as:














Consider the case in which δ = 0. Since in this case the distribution is
degenerate, the optimization problem is somewhat diﬀerent in character, and
we cannot use b ε as the choice variable. Write the optimization problem in




















t ∀t. Of course, in this de-
generate case the solution will always have either m12
t = 0 or m21
t = 0∀t, and
the steady state will have m12 = m21 = 0. Let {L1∗
t }∞
t=1 denote the sequence
of sector-1 labor supplies after period 1 that result from this optimization,
and denote the optimized value of the objective function by W ∗
0. Note that
in the case δ > 0, the part of the objective function in square brackets can
be made arbitrarily close to W ∗
0 by choosing a time path for b εt that brings
mij(b εt) suﬃciently close to m
ij∗
t for each t.
Now, return to the case δ > 0. Fix some date T > 0 and ∆ > 0. Let c W0 be
deﬁned as the maximum of the objective function subject to the law of motion
and the additional constraint that |L1
T −L1∗
T | > ∆. Then b ∆ ≡ W ∗
0 −c W0 is the
minimum loss from constraining the date-T labor allocation to be at least ∆
away from its degenerate-case optimum. By (1), the ﬁrst term of (24) can
be made uniformly smaller than b ∆/2 be choosing δ small enough. With δ
so chosen, any time path for b εt that leaves L1
T farther away from L1∗
T than
∆ can be improved upon by choosing a time path for b εt that brings mij(b εt)
suﬃciently close to m
ij∗
t for each t. Hence, for δ so chosen, the optimal policy
will bring L1
T to within ∆ of L1∗
T . But this is, then, true for any value of T.
Proof of Proposition 12. Let the distribution of µ ≡ ε1 − ε2 be
characterised by a cdf Gδ(µ) =
R
Fδ(µ+ε2)fδ(ε2)dε2, with pdf gδ(µ) = G0
δ(µ).
First, note that the logconcavity of f1 implies that g1 is also logconcave.
This can be seen as follows. Since for any e ε and e µ the probability that








−∞ f1(ε2 + µ)f1(ε2)dµdε2, the joint density function φ(µ,ε2) for µ and
ε2 is given by φ(µ,ε2) = f1(ε2 + µ)f1(ε2). It can be veriﬁed mechanically
that the logconcavity of f1 implies that the Hessian of log(φ(µ,ε2)) is negative
deﬁnite, so that φ is itself logconcave. Therefore, by Proposition 4(ii) of An
(1998), the marginal distribution
R
φ(µ,ε2)dε2, which is equal to g1(µ) by
deﬁnition, is logconcave.18
Claim. For any x0 < 0 and x00 > x0, if {x(k),y(k),λ(k)}∞
k=0 is such that




Note that G1(λ(k)x(k)) → 0. If x00 > 0, then G1(λ(k)y(k)) → 1, so
the result follows. If x00 = 0, then if limsupk→∞ λ(k)y(k) > −∞, then
limsupk→∞ G1(λ(k)y(k)) > 0, and the result follows.
Now suppose that λ(k)y(k) → −∞ (the only remaining case). Since g1
is logconcave, G1 also must be, by Lemma 3 of An (1998). Assume that
limsupk→∞ G1(λ(k)y(k))/G1(λ(k)x(k)) = Λ < ∞; this will be seen shortly
to lead to a contradiction. It follows that limsupk→∞[log(G1(λ(k)y(k))) −
log(G1(λ(k)x(k)))] = log(Λ). Choose K large enough that k > K implies






for any z > x00. However, the numerator of the left-hand side has a ﬁnite
limsup and the denominator grows without bound, so the only value of the
right-hand side that could satisfy the inequality for all values of k > K is zero.
That implies that G1(x) is constant on [x00,∞). This is impossible because
g1 has full support (and because it is symmetric about zero). Therefore,
limsupk→∞[log(G1(λ(k)y(k))) − log(G1(λ(k)x(k)))] = ∞. This proves the
claim.
Now consider a sequence {δ(k)} of values of δ such that δ(k) → 0 as
k → ∞, and let mij(k) and υj(k) denote the values of steady-state gross
ﬂows and worker payoﬀs corresponding with δ (k). Note that, since L1
t+1 =








t (L − L1
t), for any k, the steady-state level of
































12 = β(υ2 − υ1) − C12 and ε
21 = β(υ1 − υ2) − C21, so ε
12 =
−ε
21 − C12 − C21.
For the moment assume that at least one of C12, C21 is strictly positive.
If the limsupε
12(k) ≡ z > −(C12 + C21)/2, we can ﬁnd a subsequence
such that ε
12(k) → z and ε
21(k) → −z − C12 − C21 < 0. Since also in
this case −z − C12 − C21 < z, by the Claim, m12(k)/m21(k) → ∞ and so
within this subsequence L
1
(k) → 0. Thus, w1(k) → ∞ and w2(k) → 0 as
k → ∞. Since υi(k) = wi(k) + E{εi,εj} max{εi + βυi(k),εj − Cij + βυj(k)},
this ensures that for k suﬃciently large, ε
21(k) = β(υ1(k) − υ2(k)) − C21 >
β(υ2(k)−υ1(k))−C12 = ε
12(k), which is a contradiction. Thus, we ﬁnd that
limsupε
12(k) ≤ −(C12 + C21)/2.
If liminf ε
12(k) ≡ z < −(C12 + C21)/2, we can ﬁnd a subsequence such
that ε
12(k) → z and ε
21(k) → −z − C12 − C21 > z. Therefore, by the
Claim, m21(k)/m12(k) → ∞ and within this subsequence L
1
(k) → L. Thus,
w2(k) → ∞ and w1(k) → 0 as k → ∞, ensuring that for k suﬃciently large
ε
21(k) < ε




12(k) ≤ −(C12 + C21)/2 ≤ liminf ε
12(k), so ε
12 →
−(C12 + C21)/2 as k → ∞. Substituting in ε
12 = β(υ2(k) − υ1(k)) − C12
gives the result.
Finally, the same arguments can be traced trivially in the case in which
C12 = C21 = 0, mutatis mutandis.
41References
[1] An, MarkYuying (1998). “Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Com-
plete Characterization.” Journal of Economic Theory 80, pp. 350-69.
[2] Artu¸ c, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren (forthcoming).
“Delay and Dynamics in Labor Market Adjustment: Simulation Re-
sults.” Forthcoming, Journal of International Economics.
[3] Artu¸ c, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren (2007). “Trade
Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach.”
NBER Working Paper #13465 (October).
[4] Borjas, George J. (1995). “The Economics of Immigration.” Journal of
Economic Literature 32, pp. 1667-717.
[5] Chaudhuri, Shubham and John McLaren (2007). “Some Simple Ana-
lytics of Trade and Labor Mobility.” NBER Working Paper #13464
(October).
[6] Davidson, Carl and Steven J. Matusz (2001). “On Adjustment Costs.”
Michigan State University Working Paper.
[7] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin and Steven J. Matusz (1999). “Trade
and Search Generated Unemployment.” Journal of International Eco-
nomics 48:2 (August), pp. 271-99.
[8] Dehejia, Vivek (2003). “Will Gradualism work when Shock Therapy
Doesn’t?” Economics and Politics 15:1 (March), pp. 33-59.
[9] Dixit, Avinash (1993). “Prices of Goods and Factors in a Dynamic
Stochastic Economy.” In Wilfred J. Ethier, Elhanan Helpman and J. Pe-
ter Neary (eds.), Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade:
Essays in Honor of Ronald W. Jones. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge
University Press.
[10] Dixit, Avinash and Rafael Rob (1994). “Switching Costs and Sectoral
Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk.” Journal of
Economic Theory 62, pp. 48-69.
[11] Drazen, Allan (1985). “State Dependence in Optimal Factor Accumula-
tion.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 100:2 (May), pp. 357-72.
42[12] Freund, Caroline, and John McLaren (1999). “On the Dynamics of Trade
Diversion: Evidence from Four Trade Blocks”. International Finance
Discussion Paper 637, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Washington, D.C.
[13] Gale, David and Hukukane Kikaido (1965). “The Jacobian Matrix and
Global Univalence of Mappings.” Mathematische Annalen 159, pp.81-93.
[14] Goeree, Jacob K. and Theo Oﬀerman (2003). “Competitive Bidding in
Auctions with Private and Common Values.” Economic Journal 113
(July), pp. 598-613.
[15] Hanson, Gordon H. and Matthew J. Slaughter (1999). “The Rybczynski
Theorem, Factor-Price Equalization, and Immigration: Evidence from
U.S. States.” NBER Working Paper 7074 (April).
[16] Hosios, Arthur J. (1990). “Factor Market Search and the Structure of
Simple General Equilibrium Models,” The Journal of Political Economy,
98:2 (April), pp. 325-355.
[17] Irwin, Douglas A. (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Pol-
icy? Evidence from the British General Election of 1923.” In Feenstra,
Robert C., Gene M. Grossman, and Douglas A. Irwin (eds.), The Po-
litical Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 53-75.
[18] Jones, Ronald I. (1971). “A Three-factor Model in Theory, Trade and
History.” In Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Essays in Honor
of C.P. Kindleberger, ed. by Bhagwati et. al. Amsterdam: North Hol-
land.
[19] Jovanovic, Boyan and Robert Moﬃtt (1991). “An Estimate of a Sectoral
Model of Labor Mobility,” Journal of Political Economy, 98:4, pp. 827-
852.
[20] Karp, Larry and Thierry Paul (1994). “Phasing In and Phasing Out
Protectionism with Costly Adjustment of Labour,” Economic Journal
104:427 (November), pp. 1379-92.
43[21] Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Prescott, Edward C. (1974). “Equilibrium
Search and Unemployment.” Journal of Economic Theory 7:2 (Febru-
ary), pp. 188- 209.
[22] Magee, Stephen P. (1989). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem.” Ch. 7 in Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie
Young, Black Hole Tariﬀs and Endogenous Policy Theory, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
[23] Matsuyama, Kiminori (1992). “A Simple Model of Sectoral Adjust-
ment.” Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 375-88.
[24] McKenzie, Lionel (1960). ”Matrices with Dominant Diagonals and Eco-
nomic Theory,” Chapter 4 in Kenneth J. Arrow, Samuel Karlin and
Patrick Suppes, Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, 1959, pp.
47-62. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
[25] Mussa, Michael (1978). “Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 86:5, pp. 775-91.
[26] (1982). “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process,” in
Jagdish N. Bhagwati (ed.), Import Competition and Response, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
[27] Neary, Peter (1985). “Theory and Policy of Adjustment in an Open
Economy,” in David Greenaway, Current Issues in International Trade:
Theory and Policy, Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, pp.43-61.
[28] Patel, Jagdish, C. H. Kapadia, and D. B. Owen (1976). Handbook of
Statistical Distributions, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.
[29] Pissarides, Christopher (2000). Equilibrium Unemployment Theory (2nd
edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[30] Rappaport, Jordan (2000). “Why are Population Flows so Persistent?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper RWP 99-13.
[31] Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter (1998). “What Explains
Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” NBER Working paper #6531,
(April).
44[32] (1999). “Labor-Market Competition and Individual Preferences
Over Immigration Policy.” NBER Working Paper #6946 (February).
[33] Sjaastad, Larry A. (1962) “The Costs and Returns of Human Migra-
tion.” Journal of Political Economy, 70: 5, pt. 2, pp. S80-S93.
[34] Slaughter, Matthew J. (1998). “International Trade and Labor-Market
Outcomes,” Economic Journal, 108:450 (September), pp. 1452-1462.
[35] Staiger, Robert and Guido Tabellini (1999). “Do GATT Rules Help Gov-
ernments Make Domestic Commitments?” Economics and Politics,11:2
(July), pp.109-144.
[36] Stokey, Nancy L. and Robert E. Lucas, Jr. (1989). Recursive Methods
in Economic Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[37] Topel, Robert H. (1986) “Local Labor Markets.” Journal of Political
Economy, 94: 3, pt. 2, pp. S111-S143.
45